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World War I dismantled Imperial Germany and, long after the fighting had ceased, continued to shape the newly-born Weimar 
Republic.  This paper argues that a war over the memory of the Great War in Germany led to Weimar’s downfall.  The Weimar 
Republic’s lack of a collective memory of the first total war became the center of the political debate on the republic’s viability 
and Germany’s future.  This war debate was potently wielded in the arenas of literature and art to heighten political conflict and 
ensure that the war’s memory seeped into every aspect of society.  Ultimately, Weimar’s inability to promote any consensus on the 




This paper is about the havoc World War I 
unleashed on Germany and its impact on the Weimar 
Republic. While the war dismantled Imperial Germany, a 
second war soon began to brew within the newly-formed 
republic. This war over the memory of the Great War was a 
key player in Weimar’s destruction, and was rooted in 
differing interpretations of the war’s meaning, which existed 
as soon as the declarations of August 1914. The first of such 
narratives was the “Spirit of 1914,” an exuberant celebration 
of the war’s conception that took hold of Germans and drove 
them and their celebrations into the streets. Roger 
Chickering, Professor of History in the Center for German 
and European Studies at Georgetown University, argues that 
this “rhapsody on national unity offered no realistic formula 
for solving the problems that beset Germany in 1914 [and] 
…. was bound instead to raise expectations that the pressures 
of industrial warfare were calculated to frustrate.”2 As 
colossal losses and the realization that this war would not be 
quickly fought and won beset Germans, many realized that 
the optimistic promises the “Spirit of 1914” offered would 
come to naught. The almost immediate frustration of the 
“Spirit of 1914” was a dark foreshadowing of the effects of 
the Great War.  
In this instance, we see a microcosm of the entire 
German war experience. Unrealistic expectations of the First 
World War were quickly thwarted and, in consequence, the 
disillusionment about the war that abounded was shoved into 
the hands of the Weimar Republic by Imperial Germany, 
which ceded its power at the war’s close.3  The responsibility 
to create a collective memory about the lost war to give 
meaning to the millions of soldiers’ deaths and huge 
sacrifices on the part of the German population was laid at 
Weimar’s feet, and the impossibility of achieving such a feat 
subsequently ensured that overly optimistic and unrealistic 
 
1 Associate Professor, Department of History, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275. 
2 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 17.  
3 Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, translated by Richard Deveson, New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1989, 26.  
expectations of Weimar in post-war Germany would be 
frustrated, just as the “Spirit of 1914” had been. 
While the legacy of World War I consumed 
national debate in all countries that it marred, its memory 
was more manageable in the victorious Allied countries, 
where colossal losses were, in a sense, justified by victory. 
Its legacy in Weimar Germany, however, was heavily 
contested. For Weimar, the war produced seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles such as “the war guilt clause” of 
the Treaty of Versailles, a new republic that rose from the 
ashes of Imperial Germany, and the difficulty of confronting 
the unprecedented loss of life in the face of Germany’s 
defeat. Ultimately, such obstacles bred a dangerous debate, 
as they destabilized the political system. Imperial Germany’s 
defeat in a war it had vowed to win produced a bitterness and 
shame that, combined with the shock of the revolution and 
birth of the republic, ultimately divided society on the war’s 
meaning. This divisiveness created a politically fragmented 
Germany. The Weimar Republic’s lack of a collective 
memory of the first total war became the center of the 
political debate on the republic’s viability and Germany’s 
future. It engendered conflicting narratives about the war’s 
meaning that were adopted by all sides of the political 
spectrum and were used to support or dismantle the republic. 
The conservative and extremist right’s conception of the 
Great War’s memory presented a conception of the war’s 
loss that claimed Jews, communists, socialists, women, and 
the supporters of the republic “stabbed the German army in 
the back” and betrayed the monarchy through revolution. 
This interpretation relied upon a scapegoating of anyone 
who supposedly threatened the desired return to an older, 
conservative order. This narrative was explicitly used to 
attack leftist beliefs and support for the republic’s 
progressive political changes, such as the abolishment of the 
monarchy, women’s suffrage, and workers’ rights. I will 
argue that Weimar’s inability to promote any consensus on 
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the war’s meaning in the face of opposition from the 
conservative and extremist right weakened the republic 
significantly and made it most vulnerable to destruction. 
Weimar’s lack of a national memory was, essentially, the 
lack of any powerful rejection of rightist beliefs and myths 
about the Great War, and with no strong opposition to this 
narrative, it became a more accepted and appealing version 
of the war story. The war debate, however, was not solely 
limited to the political realm, and it was potently wielded in 
the arenas of literature and art to heighten political conflict 
and ensure that the war’s memory seeped into every aspect 
of society. 
Historians Detlev Peukert4 and Eric D. Weitz5 
have identified the extreme right as one of the greatest 
threats to the Weimar Republic, and historians Peter 
Fritzsche,6 Jerry Palmer,7 and Benjamin Ziemann8 all assess 
how the memory of the Great War fragmented post-war 
Germany. Recent exploration of Weimar’s history has been 
pursued in an effort to both acknowledge Weimar’s 
association with the development of the National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party, and more largely refute this 
association as the sole reason to study Weimar. As Detlev 
Peukert stated, “Weimar is more than a beginning and an 
end. The fourteen years of its existence constitute an era in 
its own right.”9  In The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of 
Classical Modernity, Peukert introduces a study of Weimar 
that challenges the previous domination of the Sonderweg 
theory, which claimed that Germany was on a fixed special 
path to Nazism and destruction. Peukert’s work argues that 
the development of Nazism was not guaranteed, and 
Weimar’s failure was due to a crisis of modernization that 
presented a host of contradictions and complications that 
destabilized the republic and made it vulnerable to the rise 
of a dangerous fascism.10 Peukert paved the way for 
extensive research that recognized Weimar as its own 
prominent period rather than a mere precursor to Nazism.  
Eric D. Weitz, professor of History at City College 
and the Graduate Center at City University of New York 
refutes Peukert’s analysis of Weimar and instead asserts that 
Weimar’s fall was not accredited to the perils of modernity, 
but that it was “pushed over the precipice by a combination 
of the established Right, hostile to the republic from its very 
founding, and the newer extreme Right.”11 Weitz 
acknowledges the costly implications of human action in 
Weimar’s downfall and eloquently explains how a 
democratic republic can be dismantled from within, by those 
who “espouse the language of democracy and use the 
 
4 Detlev J.K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of 
Classical Modernity, Translated by Richard Deveson, New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1989 
5 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. 
6 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998. 
7 Jerry Palmer, Memories from the Frontline: Memoirs and 
Meaning of The Great War from Britain, France and 
Germany, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. 
8 Benjamin Ziemann, Contested Commemorations: 
Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
liberties afforded to them by democratic institutions to 
undermine the substance of democracy.”12 
Peukert and Weitz’s broad histories of Weimar 
provide invaluable information about Weimar’s formation 
and trajectory towards destruction. Additionally, the works 
of historians who look more closely into the realm of 
memory within Weimar and its relation to the First World 
War are integral to my argument. In Germans into Nazis, 
Peter Fritzsche, professor of History at University of Illinois, 
explores how and why the Nazi Party came to power in 
Weimar Germany and eventually destroyed the republic. His 
book revolves around four monumental periods, July 1914, 
November 1918, January 1933, and May 1933, and 
examines them in chronological order to determine how 
Germany’s social and political changes coincided with the 
Nazi Party’s climactic rise to power.13 Fritzsche’s argument 
departs from the traditional observation that Germany’s 
defeat in 1918 was the catalyst of Nazism. He argues instead 
that 1914 is the true point of departure for Nazism because 
the “Spirit of 1914” anticipated the Nazi deviation from an 
established political tradition to promote a popular ethnic 
nationalism and simultaneously address social reforms that 
Germans craved when faced with the instability of the 
Weimar republic.14 Fritzsche eloquently argues that the 
outbreak of the First World War and the national mood that 
accompanied it laid the foundation for the formation and 
success of National Socialism.  
Jerry Palmer’s Memories from the Frontline offers 
a detailed analysis of how and why divergent understandings 
and representations of the war and its purpose abounded in 
the post-war societies of Great Britain, France, and 
Germany.15 Palmer focuses on literary works and memoirs 
to explore how their writers “made sense of their experiences 
through narrative, and what sense their contemporaries made 
of these texts.”16 Palmer argues that Germany faced a unique 
challenge in its public and private attempts to remember the 
war, because of its inability to establish an agreed upon 
national commemoration for its soldiers in the face of defeat, 
contentions about the 1918 surrender, and the republic’s 
birth.17 Palmer’s work explains how the contestations 
Germany faced were apparent in the memoirs and literary 
works of Weimar’s contemporaries, and emphasizes how the 
literary realm became another battleground for political 
domination.    
Like Weitz and Peukert, Benjamin Ziemann 
refutes the notion of the Sonderweg in Contested 
Commemorations: Republican War Veterans and Weimar 
Political Culture. He goes one step further though, and 
9 Ibid, xii.  
10 Peukert, xiii-xiv.  
11 Weitz, 5.  
12 Ibid, 408.  
13 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998.  
14 Ibid, 7-9. 
15 Jerry Palmer, Memories from the Frontline: Memoirs 
and Meaning of The Great War from Britain, France and 
Germany, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 5. 
16 Palmer, 13. 
17 Palmer, 203-204.  
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argues that despite general opinion, republican war veterans 
were significant players in Weimar’s debate about the 
memory of the First World War and provided extensive 
support for the republic.18 Ziemann’s work acknowledges 
the failure of groups such as the Reichsbund and 
Reichsbanner to successfully combat the Right’s narrative 
that allowed it to destroy the republic, but proves that despite 
this failure, members of such groups “were at the forefront 
of attempts to develop a pro-republican language of war 
remembrance, and to elaborate an appropriate set of 
commemorative symbols and rituals in the public sphere.”19 
Contested Commemorations proves that republican 
supporters did exist and did fight against conservative and 
extreme right conceptions of Weimar’s legitimacy and 
viability.  
My argument is unique because it will integrate 
these assessments to identify conflict over the war’s memory 
as the main reason for Weimar’s vulnerability to the right 
and further the discussion surrounding Weimar’s 
destruction. My exploration of the war memory’s influence 
on Weimar’s viability is also a continuation of the one made 
by Richard Bessel, Professor Emeritus of Twentieth Century 
History at the University of York and a specialist in the 
social and political history of modern Germany. In Germany 
after the First World War, Bessel asserts that the social, 
economic, and political issues of the Weimar Republic 
stemmed from the “Spirit of 1914,” the First World War and 
its aftermath, as well as other weakened economic social 
structures. The consequence of such challenges was that 
Weimar was never capable of transitioning to peacetime, and 
instead remained a post-war society.20 My argument differs 
from the aforementioned scholars because I conclude that 
Weimar’s debate over the memory of World War I was the 
republic’s tipping point. The disunified debate over memory 
weakened the republic and its supporters, was used by the 
conservative and extreme right to destroy the republic from 
within, and ultimately prohibited Weimar from transitioning 
out of its post-war phase. Weimar’s war of memory was the 
greatest contributing factor to the republic’s demise.  
My argument is structured into three sections. 
Section I is an exploration of the fragmentation of memory 
and understanding of the Great War in Germany between 
1914 and 1918. In this section, I will prove my argument 
through an exploration of primary sources that emphasize 
how Germans experienced and remembered the “Spirit of 
1914,” and the differences in how German soldiers 
understood their participation in the war while they fought 
in it. Section II will look at the intersection of the war 
memory and Weimar politics, and how conservatives and the 
extremist right viewed and used the war’s memory to destroy 
 
18 Benjamin Ziemann, Contested Commemorations: 
Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 278-279. 
19 Ziemann, 3. 
20 Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 283-284. 
21 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 
1914-1918, 13.  
22 See Figure 1.  
23 “Enthusiasm and Sympathy for Austria on the Streets of 
Berlin, August 1, 1914, in German History in Documents 
the Weimar Republic. Section III will explore the 
intersection of the politics surrounding the war’s memory 
and Weimar’s artistic realms of art and literature. I will then 
conclude with an analysis of how and why the memory of 
the war was so contested and why such contestation was so 
dangerous to the Weimar Republic.  
 
2. FRAGMENTATION OF MEMORY 
DURING THE WAR 
The announcement of Germany’s participation in 
the war in the summer of 1914 sparked an enormous spirit 
of unification within the country. Public festivals 
accompanied press announcements of the imminent march 
towards war. Armed with patriotic songs and the waving of 
flags, men and women gathered in public squares, on street 
corners, and around kiosks to celebrate in the exhilaration of 
the diplomatic crisis.21 A photo by an unknown 
photographer dated August 1, 1914 shows a large gathering 
of Berliners in a square surrounding a portrait of the Austrian 
Emperor Franz Joseph I.22 The men in the crowd lifted their 
hats to the Emperor to exemplify their support for their 
Austrian ally and their excitement about Germany’s 
participation in the burgeoning conflict.23 This sentiment is 
mirrored in Mein Kampf. Adolf Hitler, the future leader of 
the Nazi Party, remarked on the pervasive sense of joy that 
overtook him upon the war’s declaration, “those hours 
appeared like the redemption from the annoying moods of 
my youth…. overwhelmed by impassionate enthusiasm, I 
had fallen on my knees and thanked Heaven out of my 
overflowing heart that it had granted me the good fortune of 
being allowed to live in these times.”24 Excitement for the 
war was not limited to extreme nationalists. Ernst Troeltsch, 
a liberal theologian and a member of the German 
Democratic Party, observed that “under this incredible 
pressure German life melted in that indescribable wonderful 
unity of sacrifice, brotherhood, belief, and certainty of 
victory which was, and is, the meaning of the unforgettable 
August.”25 August of 1914 would be remembered 
throughout the war and the years of the Weimar Republic, 
but its meaning was not unified.     
What would later be referred to as the “Spirit of 
1914” had overtaken the country, and this immediate sense 
of national duty and consciousness would frame public 
understanding and memory of the war’s meaning for years 
to come. Kaiser Wilhelm II addressed this feeling of unity 
when he spoke on the balcony of the royal palace on August 
1, 1914, to celebrate the beginning of the war:   
Should there be battle, all political parties will 
cease to exist! I, too, have been attacked by one 
and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=2288. 
24 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 1925 in German History in 
Documents and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=817. 
25 Ernst Troeltsch, Der Kulturkrieg (Berlin 1915), 25-26, in 
The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in 
Germany by Jeffrey Verhey, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, 5.  
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party or another. That was in times of peace. It is 
now forgiven with all my heart. I no longer think 
in terms of parties or confessions; today we are all 
German brothers and only German brothers. If our 
neighbors want it no other way, if our neighbors 
do not grant us peace, then I hope to God that our 
good German sword will emerge victorious from 
this hard battle.”26  
The Kaiser emphasized the feeling of unity that permeated 
Germany, and particularly how in this time of crisis, German 
identity overshadowed all other religious, social, or political 
affiliations that had caused discussion within German 
society. The Kaiser also instilled, though subtly, another 
prominent German interpretation of the war in his reference 
to Germany’s neighbors and their treatment of the German 
nation. He placed the burden of ending the war on every 
nation except Germany, insinuating that Germany’s 
declaration of war was an act of self-defense and non-
aggression. This declaration categorized Germany as the 
non-guilty party, which the German population internalized 
so fully that it believed Germany had no responsibility for 
the consequences of the conflict. This perception of the war 
would permeate German opinions even after its end in 1918, 
and would influence the post-war international environment, 
particularly with the Treaty of Versailles. While the Kaiser’s 
emphasis on a national unity was a product of the 
governmental tactic to spark support for the war effort, it 
also reflected an experience that many Germans shared in 
the summer of 1914.  
While the “Spirit of 1914” was prevalent in the 
hearts of many, and became a beacon of hope that many 
clung to, its popularity should not suggest that Imperial 
Germany was united. In Imperial Germany and the Great 
War: 1914-1918, Roger Chickering emphasizes the 
political, social, and cultural disunity that Germany suffered 
when the war broke out. He remarked that the premise of the 
“Spirit of 1914” “was the involvement of all Germans in a 
great national exertion. It implied as well, however, an 
equitable sharing of both the burdens and rewards of this 
endeavor. Once these expectations were shown to be empty, 
the ‘Spirit of 1914’ took on the aura of an elusive fantasy, a 
painful reminder of the idealism that had reigned in the first 
hour.”27 As Germany became acquainted with the horrors of 
modern combat, and the painful burden that participation in 
total war required, the momentary euphorically-charged 
emotions of the summer soon faded away. In his novel, Class 
of 1902, Ernst Glaeser reflects on the situation at the home 
front, specifically, the hunger he experienced as a boy. At a 
farm where he stayed, gendarmes checked the quantities of 
grain that were threshed, and “confiscated all the harvest. 
The farmers hated them as much as they had hated the 
French in 1914; even more, for they weren’t able to shoot 
them. The word ‘enemy’ now meant gendarmes.”28 Ernst 
 
26 “The Kaiser Speaks from the Balcony of the Royal 
Palace (August 1, 1914),” German History in Documents 
and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=815.”  
27 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 
17.  
28 Ernst Glaeser, Class of 1902, Columbia: The University 
of South Carolina Press, 2008, 289.  
noted that by 1917, “we hardly mentioned the war, all our 
talk was of lack of food.”29 The ephemeral unification of all 
Germans for a common cause and hope dissipated as 
domestic suffering developed.  
The hopes of 1914 were replaced by a 
disillusionment that was heightened by the fragmentation of 
experience, and disagreement over meaning the war 
presented. In 1924, Kurt Tucholsky, a German-Jewish 
journalist and satirist, meditated on the aftermath of the 
“Spirit of 1914:”  
The wave of drunkenness which overtook the 
country ten years ago has left behind many hung-
over people who know no other cure for their 
hangover than to become drunk again. They have 
learned nothing. Today the spiritual foundation on 
which Germany rests is no different from that 
when it was founded. No spiritual experience has 
touched the country, for the war was none. It 
changed bodies into cadavers, but it left the spirit 
completely untouched.30      
Ten years after the outbreak of the First World War, 
Tucholsky criticized the continued existence of a misguided 
German populace that continued to invoke the “Spirit of 
1914” as a holy ideal without truly understanding its costly 
implications. For Tucholsky, the spirit existed as nothing 
short of unrealized desires. Later, the hope that the birth of 
the republic instilled within Germany’s populace would take 
on the same bitter sting that the “Spirit of 1914” held, as it 
too could only frustrate lofty and idealized expectations.       
The unification that the “Spirit of 1914” seemed to 
offer shattered and fragmented as men marched to battle. 
This fragmentation is apparent in how frontline soldiers 
experienced the war, and how they perceived these 
experiences. The war letters of German students who 
volunteered to fight highlight these variances in memory. 
Jerry Palmer, former Professor of Communications at 
London Metropolitan University U.K., argues that in letters 
“we find divergent ways of understanding and representing 
the war…. we [also] see different understandings of the 
purpose and overall meaning of war, independent of 
individual experiences of it.”31  Such divergences, are, 
therefore, multifaceted, as they encompass both the 
individual and collective realms of memory, which were 
politically strained at the war’s end.  
Letters written by soldiers during their time at the 
front or in battle attest to the nuances of individual 
experience and general attitudes towards the war. No one 
nation possessed a homogenous army of physically and 
mentally flawless male warriors who glorified the justice of 
war. This reality was difficult for Germany to accept, as the 
Imperial government promoted traditional, romanticized 
depictions of its soldiers. The dichotomy between soldiers’ 
interpretations of the war emphasizes this reality. Twenty-
29 Ibid.  
30 Kurt Tucholsky, “The Spirit of 1914” published in Die 
Weltbühne, August 7, 1924, in The Weimar Republic 
Sourcebook, 20.  
31 Jerry Palmer, Memories from the Frontline: Memoirs 
and Meaning of the Great War from Britain, France and 
Germany, London: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2018, 5.  
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three-year-old Franz Blumenfeld, a student of Law at 
Freiburg, wrote to his mother while on the train to the front 
on September 24th, 1914. He attempts to explain to her why 
he volunteered for the war: 
[I]t was not from any enthusiasm for war in 
general, nor because I thought it would be a fine 
thing to kill a great many people or otherwise 
distinguish myself. On the contrary, I think that 
war is a very, very evil thing, and I believe that 
even in this case it might have been averted by a 
more skillful diplomacy. But, now that it has been 
declared, I think it is a matter of course that one 
should feel oneself so much a member of the 
nation that one must unite one’s fate as closely as 
possible with that of the whole…. For what counts 
is always the readiness to make a sacrifice, not the 
object for which the sacrifice is made.32 
In his explanation, Franz expresses the duality of his own 
personal interpretation of the war. First, his moral 
convictions classify the war as monstrous and wrong. Yet, 
the intensity of his duty to the Fatherland challenges his own 
internal morality. Although disgusted by the prospects of 
fighting in a war he vehemently opposed, his national duty 
to participate and fight for Germany overshadowed his 
personal and moral convictions. Franz’s sense of national 
responsibility yet simultaneous hatred of the callous, 
inhumane war presents a fragmented interpretation of his 
experience in the conflict. This conflict within Franz shows 
how opposing interpretations of the war were not limited to 
any specific realm. Soldiers like Franz could oppose the war 
internally and still participate in it. The war, then, had no 
common, agreed upon meaning in any realm.            
One month later Franz was in Northern France, 
and on October 14th, 1914, he wrote in fear of the war’s 
negative influence on his personhood and faith in humanity. 
He was largely unmoved by the brutal realities he had to 
endure such as the harsh environmental factors of dirt, 
grime, and mud, and the constant presence of dead and 
wounded men. He writes: 
the pain of all that is not nearly so keen or lasting 
as one imagined it would be. Of course that is 
partly due to the fact that one knows one can’t do 
anything to prevent it. But may it not at the same 
time be a beginning of a deplorable callousness, 
almost barbarity, or how is it possible that it gives 
me more pain to bear my own loneliness than to 
witness the sufferings of so many others?  Can you 
understand what I mean?  What is the good of 
escaping all the bullets and shells, if my soul is 
injured?33   
Franz was faced with the task of justifying his participation 
in a cataclysmic event that was required of him by their 
homeland, but would chip away at his most human virtues. 
This was the price that many young German volunteers paid. 
 
32 Franz Blumenfeld, letter to his mother, 24 September 
1914, in German Students’ War Letters, edited by Philipp 
Witkop, translated by A. F. Wedd, Philadelphia: First Pine 
Street Books, 2002, 19-20.  
33 Franz Blumenfeld, letter, 14 October 1914 (in Northern 
France), in German Students’ War Letters, 20-21. 
Distressed at the rapid rate of his adjustment to the external 
horrors of the Great War, Franz questions the point of 
returning from an event that was destroying the best parts of 
himself. For Franz, war stripped men of their humanity and 
virtues, instead of enlightening them. Yet, not all men agreed 
with this interpretation of war’s consequences.  
Blumenfeld’s sentiment, therefore, contrasts with 
another German soldier’s perception of the war. Hero 
Hellwhich was a twenty-year-old German infantryman who 
appreciated war for the virtues it produced. In a letter to his 
parents, Hero stated, “It is not true that war hardens people’s 
hearts. Anybody who comes back hardened, must have been 
hard to start with. The effect of war is much more that of 
purifying and deepening. One thanks God every day that one 
is allowed to go on living.”34 Hero’s conception of war 
clashes with Franz’s. While they both appreciate the 
necessity of their participation for the sake of the Fatherland, 
Hero romantically and perhaps naïvely praises war for its 
ability to ‘cleanse’ its participants. Hero’s view of war 
aligned with the traditional conservative praise of fighting 
and violence. Hero’s glorification of the Great War would 
be used during and after 1918 to justify Germany’s 
participation in a failed war and to dominate Weimar’s 
debate on memory.  
As the war raged on and domestic hardships 
continued to mount, political consensus on the war’s 
meaning splintered. In the August days, the “Spirit of 1914” 
promised a victory and a coalescence of German citizens that 
made the war difficult to oppose. The fervor of the nation 
was palpable, and difficult to challenge. As Chickering 
noted, the war’s lack of collective meaning extended to 
opposition of the conflict, and dissent “was plagued…by its 
own conceptual ambiguities.”35 Thus, conflicting opinions 
of opposition to the war rested on differing conceptions of 
the conflict, which challenged any immediate form of large-
scale resistance in 1914. Resistance formed in the later years 
of the war around “‘bread-and-butter’ grievances, such as 
prices, shortages of food and fuel, working conditions, and 
censorship.”36 Domestic suffering came to the forefront of 
the political conversation about the war, but it needed to 
align with established organizations before it could hope to 
wield any significant opposition. 
In May 1916, labor demonstrators protested in 
Berlin and demanded bread, freedom and peace. One 
demonstrator, Karl Liebknecht, climbed an elevated surface 
and yelled, “Down with the war! Down with the 
government!” and was promptly arrested and later 
imprisoned.37  Liebknecht was quickly identified as a 
martyr, and the political implications of his protest aligned 
industrial strikes with war protests from 1916 to 1918. Cries 
against the war and for an immediate peace were soon 
accompanied by demands for domestic democratic reform. 
The result was the unification of the Catholic Party, the 
Progressives, and the Majority Social Democratic Party, 
34 Hero Hellwhich, undated letter, in Letters from the Front, 
selected and edited by John Laffin, London: J. M. Dent & 
Sons Ltd London, 1973, page 69.  
35 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 
1914-1918, 151.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid, 156.  
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which together possessed a majority in the Reichstag and on 
July 19, 1917 passed the “Peace Resolution.” The “Peace 
Resolution” sought peace and reconciliation, and denounced 
annexations of land and general social oppression.38 Most 
importantly, “it signaled a major rift in the domestic 
consensus that had born the war, and it threatened a 
constitutional crisis should the majority on the left refuse to 
vote additional war credits.”39 The Reichstag’s “Peace 
Resolution” officially presented a meaning of the war that 
rivaled the mythical “Spirit of 1914” interpretation.  
General Erich Ludendorff, Supreme Commander 
of the German Army, lashed out against the Reichstag’s 
formal declaration of support for peace, which threatened his 
own desires of a military victory. In response, German 
troops and the home front were subjected to programs of 
patriotism to “reinvigorate the vocabulary of patriotism as 
the governing interpretive medium of the war.”40  One facet 
of this educational sanction was Ludendorff’s formation of 
the “German Fatherland Party” in September 1917.41 The 
purpose of the Fatherland Party was to provide an 
organization that acted as a tangible representation of 
patriotic desires for victory, and to critique the Reichstag’s 
“Peace Resolution.” Germany had entered into a war of 
ideals that would evolve and take new shapes with Weimar’s 
birth in 1918.  
3. THE DEBATE AROUND MEMORY: 
POLITICS 
In 1914, widespread German belief that Germany 
would win World War I quickly and without heavy losses 
guaranteed that the legacy of defeat would be difficult, if not 
impossible for many Germans to bear and would 
immediately spark a debate within Weimar. The German 
army steadily collapsed between August and September of 
1918, and between 750,000 and 100,000 soldiers attempted 
to evade further service through feigned illness or surrender. 
These developments ensured that by October, the German 
army was in full retreat.42  Despite such developments, the 
public continued to believe that Germany could achieve 
victory. Thus, Ludendorff’s announcement on September 
29th that the war had been lost and the government’s next 
step was to negotiate an armistice shocked both the civilian 
population and the soldiers still in battle.43 German 
politicians were forced to cope with defeat by any means 
possible.  
One facet of the discussion about Germany’s loss 
was rooted in beliefs surrounding the military’s viability in 
the war’s final days. A Reichstag Subcommittee was formed 
to investigate the collapse of the military in 1918. Albrecht 
Philipp of the conservative German National People’s Party 
or DNVP, served as the German National chair of the 
subcommittee, and he directly addressed what he claimed 
was the “sabotage” of the war effort, which included 
 
38 Ibid, 164.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 
1914-1918, 165.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid, 186-187.  
43 Ibid, 187.  
shirking, desertion to the enemy, mutiny, and strikes. Philipp 
stated that shirking was “felt both at home and in the field. 
At home it took the shape of applications for exemption. It 
is of course difficult to give exact figures here. During the 
war the public frequently complained of the numbers of 
exemptions demanded by the Jews…. there is no doubt that 
this fact influenced the mentality of those at the front.”44  
Philipp’s scapegoating of German Jews ignores the shirking 
of military duty by non-Jewish Germans, which would have 
outweighed that of Jews. In blaming Jews specifically, 
Philipp also contributed to the development of the “Stab-in-
the-Back Myth” adopted by the right, which blamed Jews for 
the war loss. Philipp’s statements suggest that as a 
conservative, he too held popular nationalistic beliefs that 
Jews shirked their duties and thus catalyzed Germany’s loss. 
The anti-Semitic narrative that Philipp promotes is a direct 
response to the German military’s loss of the war at the 
hands of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. As a conservative 
who supported Imperial Germany’s war aims, Philipp’s 
claims of subversion and sabotage of the military reflect a 
blatant attempt to promote anti-Semitism and deflect the 
burden of failure from the German Supreme Command so it 
could retain a semblance of authority.   
Accompanying the question of sabotage in the 
post-war political debate was the question of whether 
Germany could have realistically continued to fight in 
November of 1918, a large area of contestation that further 
fragmented collective memory and meaning of the war. 
Retired general and conservative, Hermann von Kuhl, 
worked with the Reichstag subcommittee to investigate the 
German military’s collapse. To the question of whether the 
German Army could have continued the fight in November, 
Kuhl answered yes. He acknowledged the general impacts 
of the exhaustion of the army in numbers and morale, but 
ultimately credited the downfall of the army to “pacifist, 
international, anti-militaristic endeavors and the 
revolutionary undermining of the Army conducted from the 
interior of the country.”45 He explicitly named the 
Independent Social Democrats as perpetrators of such 
agitations. Kuhl’s testimony is a defense of the commanders 
of the German army and an attempt to discredit the 
participants of the revolution, which reflects his conservative 
background and high-ranking military service. While Kuhl 
addressed the limitations of an army that had been fighting 
for four years, he placed the blame for Germany’s loss at the 
hands of the revolution. This undermined the stability of the 
Weimar Republic by claiming that its birth was the catalyst 
of Germany’s defeat in World War I. This was a criticism 
that conservatives and the radical right would continue to 
promote to attack the republic.  
Claims that Germany could continue the fight 
through 1918 were contrasted with assessments that 
Germany was at its breaking point. Simon Katzenstein, a 
Reichstag deputy and Majority Social Democratic publicist, 
44 “Dr. Philipp on Sabotage of the War Effort” in The Stab-
in-the-Back Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic: A 
History in Documents and Visual Sources edited by George 
S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, New York: Bloomsbury, 68.  
45 “Could we have kept on Fighting in the Autumn?” in The 
Stab-in-the-Back-Myth, edited by George S. Vascik and 
Mark R. Sadler, 72.  
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gave a deposition that challenged the statements given by 
Albrecht Philipp. Katzenstein argued that revolutionary 
ideas gained success because of the general tension and 
exhaustion participation in the war fostered.46 He agreed that 
shirking and desertion were explicitly connected with such 
exhaustion, but refuted Philipp’s sole blame of Jews and 
revolutionaries stating:  
It would require an intensive investigation that 
goes beyond superficial anecdotal evidence to 
determine how much shirking went on as the result 
of personal relationship and bribery. This is 
particularly true in the case of the superficial 
rumors that Jews shirked service more than other 
groups. The same could be said of similar 
accusations  against civil servants, landowners, 
and some members of the officer corps.47 
Katzenstein criticized the conservative and nationalist 
narrative that Philipp promoted for its explicit blame of a 
vulnerable minority group, as well as for its inability to 
address Imperial Germany’s failure. This criticism reflects 
Katzenstein’s support for the republic and is an explicit 
challenge of the use of shirking to discredit the republic’s 
supporters.  
Like Katzenstein, Herbert Corey, a correspondent 
for The Washington Evening Star, recognized the critical 
military situation, and refuted the nationalist attempt to 
paper it over with fanciful claims of victory. In 1919, Corey, 
accompanied by other correspondents, observed the German 
Army in its retreat, and noted how “now and then an under 
officer repeated the one tenet of that dangerous cult which is 
gaining ground in Germany…which is ‘the German armies 
have never been defeated.’  I do not doubt that this was 
dictated from the general staff…. But the very men who 
repeated it knew that it was essentially false…. ‘We were 
finished.’ they said. ‘Kaput. We could do no more.’”48  Here, 
Corey observed a momentous development in the German 
post-war order. Paradoxically, some defeated and 
demobilizing soldiers uttered the lie that the German Army 
had not been defeated in the field, while their comrades 
simultaneously admitted that such claims were preposterous. 
Interpretations of defeat conflicted even within the ranks of 
men who had experienced it. Nationalist claims of victory 
spread like a whisper through demobilized troops, slowly 
gaining traction to the point where myth became more 
desirable than truth. This cult that nationalist circles began 
to construct as early as 1919 would develop into a potent 
narrative that attacked the revolution, the Weimar Republic, 
and any alternative or realistic memory of the war.  
Nationalist circles used their cult of memory that 
proclaimed a German victory to attempt to dismantle the 
Weimar Republic before it had fully been established. One 
tactic that conservatives adopted to bolster their cult of 
 
46 “Majority Social Democrat Simon Katzenstein Refutes 
the Kuhl-Philipp Thesis” in The Stab-in-the-Back-Myth, 
edited by George S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, 73.  
47 Ibid, 73.  
48 “Herbert Corey on the State of the German Army in 
Retreat, January 24, 1919,” in The Stab-in-the-Back-Myth, 
edited by George S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, 74-75.  
memory was to blame the revolution for Germany’s defeat. 
Conservative Albrecht Philipp again inserted himself into 
the narrative, and claimed, “The revolution deprived us of 
the last remains of our power of resistance and delivered us 
defenseless into the hands of the enemy at the very moment 
when Herr Scheidemann was announcing from the steps of 
the Reichstag that the German people had been victorious all 
along the line.”49 Philipp expressed the popular nationalist 
sentiment that the revolution corrupted and undermined the 
morale of the military, and effectively stabbed the German 
army and government in the back, ensuring defeat. Philipp’s 
assertion that revolutionaries intervened at the very moment 
that Germany could have been victorious was an ingenious 
rhetorical tactic that simultaneously strengthened the 
nationalist narrative and muddled the reality the German 
army faced in 1918. Although Germany was teetering on the 
edge of a brutal defeat, the revolution and the dismantlement 
of the monarchy presented an opportunity to deny 
Germany’s defeat and possibly restore the nation to its 
former conservative, monarchical glory. An internal lack of 
consensus on Germany’s military situation and experience 
during and immediately after the war ensured that there 
would be no agreement on an overall analysis of the war’s 
meaning for many years. And, if there had been any chance 
of such consensus, it was quickly destroyed by international 
developments with the Allies.  
As the Weimar Republic began to rise unsteadily 
to its feet, the great powers negotiated a peace that would 
establish a new European order. Domestic dissent was 
exacerbated by what was perceived as ill-treatment of a 
tattered, war-torn Germany by the victors. Germany’s 
representatives came to the table with hopes that Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points would dominate discussion and that a 
revival of a strong Germany was a goal that coincided with 
America’s wishes.50 Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which 
championed unselfish peace terms, alluded to the possibility 
of lenient negotiations, that would ensure the creation of a 
new world order that was compatible with democracy.51  
Unfortunately, the German representatives possessed 
severely misguided expectations of the allied powers. Public 
opinion of Germany in France and Great Britain was not 
cordial in the least. Great Britain’s Prime Minister, David 
Lloyd George, based his 1918 reelection campaign on the 
slogan, ‘Hang the Kaiser!’ and promoted a trial of the Kaiser, 
blaming him for the war.52 At Versailles, the German 
delegation walked blindly into a Charybdis. The Times 
reported that the German foreign minister Count Ulrich von 
Brockdorff-Rantzau arrived with a delegation of eight 
others, and “their behaviour on their arrival is the talk of 
Paris. They seem to have expected to have perfect liberty of 
49 “Dr. Philipp on the Revolution as the Cause of Military 
Collapse,” in The Stab-in-the-Back-Myth, edited by George 
S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, 84.  
50 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018, 34.  
51 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 
1914-1918, 188.  
52 “Macdonald Renews War on Lloyd George” in The New 
York Times, May 28, 1929, 6.  
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movement during their stay at Versailles.”53 When stopped 
by a policeman for leaving the bounds of a park, Baron von 
Lersner and Herr Warburg “indignantly protested that Allied 
officers in Germany were allowed to go about anywhere in 
uniform,”54 clearly misunderstanding the power dynamics 
between their nations. Additionally, many of the delegates 
“brought golf clubs with them, which suggests that they 
expect not only to have plenty of freedom but also plenty of 
time to spend at Versailles.”55 These strange occurrences 
emphasize the awkwardness that surrounded the peace talks, 
and the German assumption that they were, in a sense, on 
equal footing with the Allies. Unfortunately, Germany had 
sent men of a pre-World War I political world to negotiate 
with nations that were irrevocably changed by the war. As 
Weitz noted, when “Brockdorff-Rantzau [sported] a 
monocle and a haughty manner, he aroused the Allies’ worst 
images of aristocratic, militaristic Germany.”56 Golf clubs 
and monocles signify that the German delegates viewed the 
peace talks with levity and an assumption of equality that 
would only deepen the blow of the peace terms and catalyze 
catastrophic consequences within Weimar.  
The announcement of the peace terms shocked the 
German delegation. As the German press obtained and 
published the details of the treaty, a feeling of disbelief 
shook the nation. The terms imparted what many Germans 
perceived as significant losses. As Peukert noted, when 
studying the significance of the Treaty of Versailles it is 
important to distinguish “between the psychological burdens 
which Versailles imposed and the real effects of the peace 
treaty.”57 Germany lost the territories of Alsace-Lorraine, 
large parts of Posen and West Prussia, the Memel region, and 
control over Upper Silesia and the Saar, as well as all its 
colonies.58 Although, such losses appear vast, they were 
essentially valueless.59  The reduction of the military, navy, 
and air force followed. Germany could not mobilize under 
any circumstances, and in Part V of the treaty, the Allies 
dictated that the “army must not comprise more than seven 
divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry”60 with 
no more than “6 battleships…6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 
[and] 12 torpedo boats.”61 Loss of territory and military 
prowess was insurance for the Allies, a control mechanism 
that ensured Germany would not attempt to remobilize its 
forces and continue the war. One consequence of Part V of 
the treaty for Weimar was the new government’s need for a 
police force. The Social Democratic government was forced 
to rely instead on the Freikorps for armed protection and 
enforcement of laws, paramilitary bands that identified with 
the extreme right, and were ideologically opposed to the 
values of the republic.62   
Germany’s forced reduction of her forces was 
fodder for German nationalists and the press, but even more 
 
53 “Germans and the Terms” in The Times, April 29, 1919.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Weitz, Weimar Germany, 34.  
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58 Weitz, Weimar Germany, 35.  
59 Peukert, 44.  
60 Part V of the Treaty of Versailles in Inside Hitler’s 
Germany: A Documentary History of Life in the Third 
humiliating was Part VIII of the treaty, which detailed the 
reparations clauses. The domestic debate over the 
reparations clauses and Article 231 would slowly tear 
Weimar apart in the coming years. Many considered the 
treaty to be a diktat that was forcefully imposed by the Allies 
without any consent from Germany, and referred to it as 
such. The reparations clauses sparked a new hostility in 
Weimar’s conversations about the war’s memory. The treaty 
declared, “Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany 
and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which 
the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals 
have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed 
upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.”63  
The “war-guilt clause” was, in the eyes of Great Britain, the 
United States, and France, a justification for their demand 
for reparations. Peukert claimed that this clause was a direct 
product of the influence of the “Spirit of 1914.”64 It is 
notable that the “Spirit of 1914” produced a general belief 
that losses caused by the war would be rectified by massive 
victory and this belief extended to all participating nations. 
The harsh realities of four years of mobilization induced the 
Allies to demand ‘the spoils of triumph’65 and once this was 
combined with a violent public sentiment towards Germany, 
and cries for ‘Hang the Kaiser!’, Germany’s guilt, at least in 
the eyes of the victors, was solidified.  
The republican government and Constitutional 
Convention signed the treaty, but as a result, all of Weimar’s 
first government resigned.66 Even the first chancellor under 
the Constitutional Convention and member of the Social 
Democratic Party, Philipp Scheidemann, protested the 
treaty. He “cried out that all Germans, from whatever group 
(Stamm) or state (Land), stood together: ‘We are of one flesh 
and one blood, and whoever tries to separate us cuts with a 
murderous knife into the living body of the German 
people.’”67 Despite such nationalistic rhetoric, Germany 
ultimately had no choice but to sign or endure a resumption 
of the war and an Allied invasion. The Weimar Republic was 
months old and had to assume international responsibility for 
Imperial Germany’s war, which would taint the republic 
irrevocably in the eyes of the Allied victors and its own 
citizens. While the government ultimately signed the treaty 
and its supporters stood by this decision, conservatives and 
members of the extreme right would never accept the 
humiliation of the Diktat. Instead, they would use it as 
political ammunition against the republic in the coming 
debate over the Great War’s memory.  
 Domestic German reactions to the peace terms 
were hostile and catalyzed a violent national discussion 
about the war and its meaning. Anger over the terms of the 
treaty and the negative international perception of Germany 
they promoted resulted in a momentary unification of 
Reich, edited by Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kuntz, 
Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1992, 48.  
61 Ibid, 49.  
62 Weitz, Weimar Germany, 97.  
63 “The Treaty of Versailles: The Reparations Clauses,” in 
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republican supporters and the most conservative of the 
German Reichstag. Unfortunately, while many liberals, 
including the chancellor, Scheidemann, could denounce the 
Treaty of Versailles alongside the right, unification of 
conservative and leftist outrage was ephemeral.68  After the 
treaty had been signed and the government was re-instated 
under President Friedrich Ebert, member of the liberal Social 
Democratic party, supporters of the Weimar Republic who 
continued to critique the treaty subtly undermined its 
legitimacy. Anger moved to an alternative, often rhetorical 
realm. Philosopher, theologian, and defender of the republic 
Ernst Troeltsch remained stalwart in his opposition to 
Germany’s acceptance of responsibility.69 Troeltsch was a 
member of the German Democratic Party, which had joined 
the KPD, SPD, and Catholic Center Party to form the 
Weimar Coalition and demand democracy in 1917. In “The 
Dogma of Guilt,” Troeltsch analyzed the roots of the guilt 
clause and provided an explanation for its existence. 
Troeltsch asserted:  
This peace, while presenting itself as a court of 
inquisition, is also an imperialist monstrosity 
made possible by the deceit of the Fourteen Points 
and by Germany’s voluntary disarmament. It is 
reminiscent of the way Rome once proceeded 
against Carthage. The German counterproposals 
to this peace acknowledged the legitimate 
demands for reconstruction assistance for severely 
damaged France and Belgium…. Instead, the 
response to them was: the heretic is to be burned.70 
Troeltsch’s perception of Germany’s international plight 
was a common opinion throughout Germany. His diction 
bears notable historical and political allusions that are meant 
to incite outrage at the Allied treatment of Germany. He 
casts Great Britain, France, and the United States as 
inquisitors in a court whose final assessment of logical 
German counterproposals is to ‘burn the heretic.’ In 
Troeltsch’s analysis, Germany’s only responsibility in the 
situation is its folly for voluntarily disarming. This analysis 
by a supporter of the republic was problematic because it 
promoted hatred of the treaty and contributed to the right’s 
narrative. Troeltsch implies that history will repeat itself, and 
as Rome once ostracized and then razed Carthage, so too will 
the victors decimate Germany. This popular, bitter domestic 
response treated the peace as a Diktat, and was used by the 
conservatives and extremist right to destroy the Weimar 
Republic by attacking its credibility.  
While hatred for the Treaty of Versailles was often 
used by the right, the Stab-in-the-Back Myth was the 
primary tool of the nationalist and conservative war narrative 
to undermine the legitimacy of the republic. The Stab-in-the-
Back Myth, or Dolchstoßlegende in German, quickly gained 
traction at the end of the First World War as an explanation 
for why Germany was defeated in November of 1918, and 
 
68 Weitz, Weimar Germany, 36.  
69 The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton 
Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994, 6.  
70 Ernst Troeltsch, “The Dogma of Guilt” June 19, 1919 in 
The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 12.  
71 George S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, The Stab-in-the-
Back-Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic: A History 
who was to blame for its defeat. In The Stab-in-the-Back-
Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic, historians George 
S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler argue that Germany’s defeat 
in the fall of 1918 was psychologically devastating, and this 
shock necessitated an explanation. Alternative conceptions 
of Germany’s fate and lived experiences resulted in differing 
narratives, but at the heart of many was the feeling of 
betrayal. One extreme interpretation claimed that Imperial 
Germany, the army, and the navy, had all been stabbed in the 
back by domestic agitators, while another extreme asserted 
that the proletarian revolution was betrayed by Friedrich 
Ebert and the Majority Social Democrats, and the revolution 
had not accomplished enough. 71 Conflicting narratives of 
betrayal would compete for dominance in Weimar’s political 
quagmire, and although the Dolchstoß housed multiple 
interpretations, the nationalist narrative became most 
prevalent and popular. 
Nationalist supporters of the Stab-in-the-Back-
Myth ironically credited its birth to an English general, 
rather than any one of their own parties. Major General Sir 
Frederick Barton Maurice, a career military officer, served 
as Director of Military Operations of the Imperial General 
Staff in London in 1914 and, according to his German 
nationalist supporters, possessed knowledge of the military 
abilities of the German army.72  Maurice was, therefore, 
considered to be a credible outside source who could 
accurately comment upon Germany’s undefeated status in 
the Great War. The trouble began with a simple publication 
in the Deutsche Tageszeitung, a conservative democratic 
paper, on December 18, 1918, that claimed General Maurice 
had written in the Daily News, “The civilian population 
stabbed the Germany army to death from behind. The 
behavior of the sailors of the German fleet was disreputable. 
They chose to surrender their ships to the enemy, rather than 
to defy death. They were the ones who saved Paris.”73 The 
correspondent writing this piece blatantly misinterpreted his 
source, a report on General Maurice’s articles in the Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, that confusingly made it unclear whether 
“Maurice believed that the civilian population stabbed the 
army in the back or that it was a ‘common view’ within the 
British populace and not necessarily shared by Maurice.”74 
Despite the truth or untruth behind his words, the sentiment 
had become an imperative tenet of the Stab-in-the-Back-
Myth. The notice gave the myth credibility by placing it in 
the mouth of General Maurice, and, more importantly, 
granted nationalists a scapegoat for the failure of their 
“invincible” German Army. The Dolchstoßlegende only 
needed a reputable German spokesperson to commend it, 
which it found in the figure of Paul von Hindenburg.  
Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg and General 
Erich Ludendorff served as the two leaders of Germany’s 
Supreme Military Command from 1916 until the end of the 
First World War. At the end of September 1918, Ludendorff 
in Documents and Visual Sources, New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2016, 1.  
72 Vascik and Sadler, The Stab-in-the-Back-Myth, 94. 
73 “Deutsche Tageszeitung Notice: ‘The Stabbed-in-the-
Back German Army,’ December 18, 1918,” in The Stab-in-
the-Back-Myth edited by Vascik and Sadler, 95.  
74 George S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, The Stab-in-the-
Back-Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic, 98. 
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was aware of Germany’s military incapacities and inability 
to continue the war, and he planned to place responsibility 
for Germany’s defeat on the shoulders of a democratic, 
civilian government to absolve Imperial Germany and the 
military of blame for the disastrous conflict.75 
Unfortunately, Ludendorff was successful, and the Stab-in-
the-Back Myth established itself as another chapter in his 
narrative. In 1919, the Allies insisted that the German 
government identify leaders of the imperial military and 
government and try them for war crimes; consequently, the 
Weimar National Assembly established a committee to 
investigate war guilt and crimes.76  Public interrogations 
followed, and it was here where the Weimar Republic 
allowed the Dolchstoßlegende to gain traction through 
testimonies. Hindenburg testified in November of 1919, and 
stated, “We were constantly concerned whether we would 
maintain the support of the Home Front until the war could 
be successfully concluded. At this time the intentional 
undermining of the army and navy began…. The collapse 
was inevitable. The revolution was only the capstone. An 
English General rightly said, ‘The German army was 
stabbed in the back.’”77 In this testimony, Hindenburg 
accomplished what Ludendorff began, and ultimately 
solidified the nationalist narrative’s preferred rhetorical 
attack of the Weimar Republic. 
After Hindenburg’s testimony to the Reichstag the 
debate around Germany’s national war memory was in full 
swing. As Vascik and Sadler aptly stated, “[h]is statement 
solidified the bounds of debate. One either believed 
Germany’s hero that the army was stabbed in the back or one 
didn’t. Opinions might differ as to the means, timing, and 
extent of the betrayal, but the nationalist position was now 
set in concrete.”78 Hindenburg was a supplement for the 
national hero Germany lacked in the Kaiser, and his support 
of the Dolchstoßlegende gave it credibility. Representations 
of the testimony appeared everywhere. A political, anti-
Semitic interpretation of the testimony was drawn by 
cartoonist Werner Hahmann and published in 
Kladderadatsch on November 30, 1919.79 In this rendering 
of the testimony, an elegant, trustworthy Hindenburg pulls 
back a curtain to reveal a once shielded ‘truth’ of the war. 
Behind the curtain, the rifle of a German infantryman has 
slipped from his grasp as a petite, sneaky woman bearing 
characteristic derogatory Jewish features, the Social 
Democratic hat, and the serpent hair of Medusa has impaled 
him from behind. Notably, the narrative was made more 
potent by its vagueness. Theoretically, one could place any 
member of any social class or group in the role of traitor or 
stabber. In Hahmann’s rendition, he promotes anti-Semitic 
and anti-feminist messages that criticize the republic’s 
inclusive reforms and ideals.  
The extremist right contributed greatly to 
conservative nationalist renditions of Germany’s lost war. In 
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Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler ruminates on his war experience 
and adds to the potency of the Stab-in-the-Back Myth. He 
blames Marxism for the 1918 Revolution and the collapse of 
the army, and equates communists with Hebrew 
corrupters.80 Hitler claims that if “twelve or fifteen thousand 
of these Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held 
under poison gas…the sacrifice of millions at the front 
would not have been in vain. On the contrary: twelve 
thousand scoundrels eliminated in time might have saved the 
lives of a million real Germans.”81 Hitler blamed the 
revolution for Germany’s failure, and placed the revolution 
solely at the hands of communists and Jews, aligning his 
argument with traditional anti-Semitic critiques. His 
misguided interpretation implies that real Germans had no 
hand in the revolution that was distinctly German. Hitler’s 
anti-Semitic interpretation of the Stab-in-the-Back Myth 
was a popular rendition in the nationalist camp. The republic 
and its supporters were faced with the impossible and 
daunting task of refuting this narrative. 
The right’s conception of Germany’s betrayal did 
not go unchallenged. Although the left could not produce 
any long-lasting and popular counterargument to the right’s 
proposed narrative, many individuals did contest it. The 
Hamburg Chapter of the Central Association of German 
Citizens of the Jewish Faith disseminated a flyer in April of 
1932 addressed directly to German men and women to 
combat anti-Semitism within Germany. The text logically 
and methodically refutes extremist ideas about race and 
religion as well as misconceptions about Judaism and 
Marxism.82  More specifically, the flyer challenges the claim 
that Jews shirked their war duties and betrayed the nation by 
stabbing it in the back. It begs the reader to “[c]onsider that 
a hundred thousand Jewish men stood next to their comrades 
on the front in the Great War. Among them twelve thousand 
died for the fatherland. Our slanderers and hatemongers have 
gone so far as to desecrate the dead.”83 The flyer brings 
attention to the monumental number of German Jews who 
fought for and were loyal to Germany in its time of war. 
Although reactions to the flyer cannot be known, its 
existence presented an important counterargument to the 
agenda of the conservatives and the extremist rights. 
Pro-republican narratives about the collective 
German memory of the First World War were nuanced and 
relied upon multiple ideals and mediums to counter the 
right’s narrative. One such ideal was the association of the 
end of the war with the German people’s liberation. This 
version of the war narrative necessitated an omission of the 
reality of German defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, and 
subsequently glossed over any significant details about the 
horrors of World War I.84 This technique is seen in a poem 
that the Majority Social Democratic Party published in 
Vorwärts, a newspaper the party edited: 
81 Ibid, 133.  
82 “The Central Association of German Citizens of the 
Jewish Faith Flyer, by the Hamburg Chapter” in The 
Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 272-274. 
83 Ibid, 275.  
84 Benjamin Ziemman, Contested Commemorations: 
Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 25.  
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… There were hardly enough coffins to take all the 
dead,  
earth had become one mass grave,  
love had died away, reconciliation suffered from a 
lingering disease,  
hatred was the only master, and this eerie dance of 
death was 
insanely directed by a scepter. 
… 
Then suddenly… 
Thrones were deposed. And the people, liberated 
and without shackles, 
Were quick to raise love and peace to the  
throne … 
You finished the battle, the need, serfdom and 
misery …  
We will always pronounce you as the year of 
freedom, 
Of your horrors, we will no longer speak …85 
Titled Farewell to 1918, this poem acknowledges the 
destruction the war caused, and defines the conflict as the 
catalyst to revolution and freedom, rather than a significant 
defeat. Additionally, the poem identifies Germany’s 1918 
revolution as a historical phenomenon rather than an action 
which defines it as an elusive happening that was separate 
from but beneficial to the people.86 In this sense, the author 
clouds the association of soldier and revolutionary, and the 
people are transformed into a passive object, essentially 
disassociated from the acts of revolution that they invoked. 
Farewell to 1918 illuminates one limitation of the pro-
republican war narrative: its omission of controversial 
realities to heighten a portrayal of German revolutionary 
victory which ultimately weakened its effectiveness.  
Another technique that pro-republican narratives 
adopted was to portray soldiers as victims of both an 
international violence and an internal German corruption 
that festered within the upper echelon of the German military 
and Imperial state. The Great War was described in terms of 
genocide, and many referred to it explicitly by this 
definition, and used the word ‘Völkermord,’ which 
simultaneously defined it as a slaughter and placed blame on 
its participants. Republican narratives that portrayed 
frontline soldiers, however, excluded the reality that 
common German men who had volunteered or been 
conscripted were also perpetrators of violence.87 A poster 
titled “No More War” advertises a commemoration 
ceremony on July 31, 1922 for those killed in combat and 
depicts a battlefield filled with mutilated and dying soldiers 
who lay beneath a sky illuminated by the presence of three, 
large united figures.88 In the illustration, war becomes the 
third quasi-character in its own right, but, only its aftermath 
is depicted. The poster presents war as something that 
 
85 ‘Abschied von 1918’, Vorwärts no. 1, 1 January 1919, 
translated by Benjamin Ziemann, cited in Contested 
Commemorations by Benjamin Ziemann, 24.  
86 Ziemann, Contested Commemorations, 25.  
87 Ibid, 41. 
88 See Figure 3.  
89 “The Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold at a mass Rally in 
Potsdam, October 26, 1924” in German History in 
happened to the passive dying soldiers, rather than 
something that they themselves participated in or waged.  
The attempt to separate soldiers from the 
perpetration of violence in World War I and instead 
emphasize their suffering muddled the pro-republican 
narrative and limited its opportunity for success. The 
separation of soldiers from violence conflicted with the 
militaristic nature of the Reichsbanner, one of the Weimar 
Republic’s primary defenders. The Reichsbanner was a 
group of war veterans founded in Magdeburg in 1924 that 
burgeoned into one of the republic’s largest mass 
organizations, and was made up of more than three million 
members.89 In a photograph from October 1924, 
Reichsbanner members march at a rally in Potsdam in a 
unified formation holding German flags and wearing 
military uniforms.90  Their militaristic formation and 
uniforms clash with pro-republican attempts to counter the 
rightist narrative of the war by portraying soldiers as victims 
and omitting violence from their identities. Ultimately, this 
destabilized the pro-republican narrative. It would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for a narrative to encompass both 
the aims of a paramilitary group and a pro-republican 
rendering of Germany’s participation in the First World War 
that denied violence. This emphasizes one of the 
characteristic elements of pro-republican war remembrance 
that Ziemann identified: “the lack of any stable and coherent 
framework or core institutional platform on which moderate 
socialists and radical democrats could rely for these 
purposes.”91   
Although republican supporters did propose an 
alternative narrative about the war’s collective memory, it 
was riddled with contradictions that ultimately weakened its 
strength against the right’s narrative. In Contested 
Commemorations, Ziemann explores the pro-republican 
recollections of the Great War and how they supported the 
Weimar Republic.92 The largest coalition of war veterans 
was mobilized by the Social Democrats to establish the 
Reichsbund of War Disabled, War Veterans and War 
Dependants in 1917 and the Reichsbanner Black–Red–Gold, 
a League of Republican Ex-Servicemen formed in 1924, that 
included members of the Center Party and DDP as well.93 
Although the members of the Reichsbanner offered an 
immersive remembrance of the First World War as a defense 
against right-wing myths, their primary focus on the past 
ensured that they “tended to neglect or perhaps even to 
obfuscate Weimar’s present future, a temporal marker that 
was of paramount importance as a motivation for republican 
activism.”94 Thus, the Reichsbanner was faced with a 
paradoxical challenge to honor and protect Weimar’s past 
and simultaneously use this narrative to advance Weimar’s 
future. Unfortunately for republican supporters, the right 
was better equipped to successfully meet this challenge 
because it presented a mythology that denied Germany’s 
Documents and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=4030. 
90 See Figure 4.  
91 Ziemman, Contested Commemorations, 25. 
92 Ibid, 1.  
93 Ibid, 3.  
94 Ibid, 7.  
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defeat, which was easier for Germans to accept than the 
reality of the lost war.  
The right was more skilled at aligning past myth 
with present desires, and this is what ultimately made its 
narrative more popular. Germany had to face the daunting 
task of transitioning from a society at war to one at peace. 
One unforeseen implication of the strain that participation in 
a total war for four years created was a desire for a return to 
a fictive better time, as Bessel has asserted. This return to 
Imperial Germany’s golden days, and a need for normalcy 
was, in the eyes of many, a simultaneous reconstitution of 
“conventional, patriarchal social and family relationships 
and [the] re-imposing [of] conservative moral codes.”95 
Bessel aptly asserted that the social and economic upheavals 
catalyzed by war and revolution threatened the mass 
masculinity of German men, and necessitated a reassertion 
of order and control, particularly in regards to the behavior 
of women.96 Conservatives and the extremist right reacted to 
this desire by incorporating it into their version of 
Germany’s war narrative, and ensuring that it was included 
in their conception of a reformed Germany. This desire to 
reassert authority was the core of the right’s narrative against 
the republic, and it was used to emphasize that the Weimar 
Republic and its supporters could not fulfill this desire. After 
the political bounds of the war debate were established, it 
extended to the realms of literature and culture, ensuring that 
the war’s memory was prevalent in every aspect of society.  
4. THE INTERSECTION OF THE MEMORY 
OF WAR AND THE ARTS 
The debate on memory entered the realm of 
literature to further fragment any attempt to establish a 
collective meaning within Weimar. Widespread support for 
works that romanticized war and works that critiqued it were 
common. One notable liberal critique of the right’s narrative 
dealt with the romanticization and normalization of war and 
violence. Traditional romantic views of the military were 
upheld and propagated throughout Germany to ensure that 
the German army was known to be prestigious and 
honorable, but the loss of the war and the inhumanity of 
modern warfare damaged this image. Some attempted to 
uphold traditional views through literature. In 1922, Ernst 
Jünger, a German soldier and author, published “Fire” to 
promote a glorified version of combat. Jünger illustrates the 
ideal German soldier and man, and defines them 
men forged of steel, whose eagle eyes peer straight 
over the propeller’s whir, studying the clouds 
ahead, who…dare the hellish journey through the 
roar of shell-pitted fields, who, for days on end, 
approaching a certain death, crouch in encircled 
nests heaped with corpses, only half alive beneath 
glowing machine guns. They are the best of the 
modern battlefield, suffused with the reckless 
spirit of the warrior, whose iron will discharges in 
clenched, well-aimed bursts of energy.97 
 
95 Bessel, Germany after the First World War, 223.  
96 Ibid, 239.  
97 Ernst Jünger, “Fire” 1922, in The Weimar Republic 
Sourcebook, 19. 
Jünger’s description emphasizes an idealized masculinity 
that stems from the possession of a warrior’s spirit and 
hinges on the notion of control. The ideal soldier is a man 
who can live unperturbed amongst corpses and gunfire, and 
although he is only “half alive,” he still manages to retain a 
certain semblance of control that allows him to rid himself 
of all emotion. The ideal man and soldier is forged by, and 
is an imitation of, war itself. Jünger’s aggressive conception 
of masculinity was no doubt an aggravated response to the 
massive mental and physical destruction the war had on 
Germany’s men. The very idea of masculinity had been 
decimated, and the right sought to reinstate it.   
Erich Maria Remarque, a German veteran of the 
First World War, condemned normative conceptions of 
violence in his publication of All Quiet on the Western Front 
in 1929, eleven years after the end of the war. Remarque’s 
masterpiece presented the war from the perspective of those 
from below, a view that challenged the memoirs of generals 
and those who peppered the upper ranks of the military.98  
All Quiet on the Western Front tells the story of a group of 
twenty young German schoolboys who, encouraged by their 
teachers, volunteered for the war, and one by one are killed 
until only half of them remain standing in 1918. The 
narrator, Paul Bäumer plays the simultaneous roles of insider 
and outsider as he experiences the war and then attempts to 
make sense of it through the narration. He analyzes his and 
his comrades’ experiences through simple, often biting 
critiques of the effects of the war and German excitement 
about it. Near the end of the story, Paul’s company 
commander, Bertnick, is killed and followed by another 
soldier, Leer, who quickly bleeds to death from a shrapnel 
wound. Paul remarks, “What use is it to him now that he was 
so good at mathematics at school?”99  Paul and his 
schoolmates have been consumed by the war to the point that 
they no longer exist in any other capacity. 
A major theme of All Quiet on the Western Front 
is betrayal. Paul reflects on how he and his schoolmates were 
persuaded by their parents and former school teacher, 
Kantorek, to enlist in the war. Kantorek marched Paul’s 
entire class to the recruiting office to enlist, and Paul 
remembers “his eyes shining at us through his spectacles and 
his voice trembling with emotion as he asked, ‘You’ll all go, 
won’t you lads?’”100  Paul remarks that one of his 
schoolmates, Josef Behm, was reluctant to enlist, but “it 
wasn’t easy to stay out of it because at that time even our 
parents used the word ‘coward’ at the drop of a hat.”101  
Behm eventually did enlist under Kantorek’s instruction, 
and was one of the first from Paul’s class to be killed. Paul 
links this consequence with Kantorek’s insistence that his 
students join the military, and here, Remarque establishes 
the feeling of betrayal of one generation by another.  
The militaristic nature of Wilhelmine society is the 
true enemy of Paul and his school friends, not the French, 
British, or American troops they fight. Remarque makes the 
point that nationalistic Imperial Germany and its proponents 
led thousands of young men to a slaughter. Paul laments: 
98 Norman Stone, All Quiet on the Western Front 
Introduction, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018, vii.  
99 Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, 240-241.  
100 Ibid, 13.  
101 Ibid, 14.  
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While they went on writing and making speeches, 
we saw field hospitals and men dying: while they 
preached the service of the state as the greatest 
thing, we already knew that the fear of death is 
even greater. This didn’t make us into rebels or 
deserters, or turn us into cowards – and they were 
more than ready to use all of those words – 
because we loved our country just as much as they 
did, and we went bravely into every attack. But 
now we were able to distinguish things clearly, all 
at once our eyes had been opened. And we saw 
that there was nothing left of their world. Suddenly 
we found ourselves horribly alone – and we had to 
come to terms with it alone as well.102 
Paul and his comrades experienced a moral bankruptcy and 
disillusionment at the hands of their parents and school 
teachers, the very people whose job it was to guide them. 
This sense of betrayal carries significant political weight, 
although Remarque makes no allusion to the 
Dolchstoßlegende. In “Erich Maria Remarque and the 
Weimar Anti-War Novels,” Brian Murdoch places All Quiet 
on the Western Front into the antiwar novel genre, and notes 
that it was common for such texts to omit the presence of the 
enemy and emphasize that there must be no more war.103  In 
All Quiet on the Western Front, the absence of any 
significant representation of the enemy serves to further 
emphasize the culpability of the Wilhelmine ruling class in 
World War I’s slaughter. This, combined with the 
experience that Paul and his comrades undergo, which is 
consistently marked as meaningless, provides a distinctly 
political message. While Remarque claims to neither confess 
nor accuse through his novel, its depiction of war defines it 
as pacifist and situates it within the liberal antiwar narrative 
of the Weimar political debate.  
Remarque provides an alternative view of the 
soldier that challenges the one Jünger presents in “Fire” and 
his book Storm of Steel. Remarque’s Paul writes about the 
horrors of the frontline, 
and so we stumble onwards, while into our bullet-
ridden, shot-through souls the image of the brown 
earth insinuates itself painfully, the brown earth 
with the greasy sun and the dead or twitching 
soldiers, who lie there as if that were perfectly 
normal, and who grab at our legs and scream as we 
try to jump over them. We have lost all feelings 
for others, we barely recognize each other when 
somebody else comes into our line of vision, 
agitated as we are. We are dead men with no 
feelings, who are able by some trick, some 
dangerous magic, to keep on running and keep on 
killing.104 
Paul’s description asserts that the war has caused more than 
just physical damage; he and his comrades possess bullet-
ridden, shot-through souls that have been decimated by their 
 
102 Ibid, 15.  
103 Brian Murdoch, “Erich Maria Remarque and the 
Weimar Anti-War Novels” in German Novelists of the 
Weimar Republic: Intersections of Literature and Politics, 
edited by Karl Leydecker, Rochester: Camden House, 
2006, 146.  
104 Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, 102.  
experiences. Remarque introduces an unseen dimension to 
Jünger’s heralding of a soldier’s ability to live dangerously 
and persevere through tough times. Through Paul, Remarque 
asserts that it is not with the aid of any mystical iron 
masculinity or will that men continued to fight, but rather 
because they too, like the bodies they tread mindlessly over, 
are dead. Remarque’s critique of the violence of war is a 
refutation of the rightist narrative that promoted violence as 
a necessary tenet of masculinity. Like the pro-republican 
conception of soldiers, Paul and his friends are portrayed as 
victims. The war had removed their humanity.    
Remarque’s novel was both admired and 
criticized. He prefaces the book, “This book is intended 
neither as an accusation nor as a confession, but simply as 
an attempt to give an account of a generation that was 
destroyed by the war – even those of it who survived the 
shelling.”105 Remarque does not attempt to express the literal 
truth of the war and the events and experiences of its 
participants, but rather the truth of the feeling of what would 
be defined by Gertrude Stein as the Lost Generation. What 
made the book controversial within Weimar’s political 
realm, however, was the interpretation by many that it did 
attempt to assert some truth. Carl Zuckmayer, a pacifist 
playwright and author, reviewed the novel in the Berliner 
Illustrirte Zeitung in January 1929, and praised it, writing 
that for the first time, someone has expressed “what went on 
in these people, what happened inside, in the mines and sap 
of the soul, in the blood, in the tissue; and that is why it is 
the first war book that offers truth.”106  Conservatives, on the 
other hand, criticized the novel for its ‘misrepresentation’ of 
the German army and military command.  
While the novel instigated political controversy, 
the release of the film catalyzed a crisis. The announcement 
in August 1929 that the production of a film adaptation of 
All Quiet by Universal Pictures Corporation was in the 
works was ill-received by the political right. In “War, 
Memory, and Politics: The Fate of the Film All Quiet on the 
Western Front” historian Modris Eksteins describes the 
history of the film’s presentation in Germany and the 
backlash that ensued, arguing that with the film’s release in 
December, “many of the frustrations and fears, and much 
hatred and resentment, prevalent in various sectors of 
German politics and the economy, would converge 
dramatically on All Quiet.”107 On the evening of December 
5, 1930 at a 7pm showing of the film, riots and protests 
organized by the Nazis broke out in the theatre. After scenes 
of a German retreat were seen, cries from Nazis and their 
supporters broke out, “‘German soldiers had courage. It’s a 
disgrace that such an insulting film was made in America!’ 
And: ‘Down with the hunger government which permits 
such a film!’”108 The film was stopped, and soon stink 
bombs, sneeze powder, and white mice were released by 
Nazis throughout the theatre, accompanied by fights and the 
Nazi assessment that they were in the presence of a Jewish 
105 Ibid.   
106 Carl Zuckmayer, “Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on 
the Western Front” 1929, in The Weimar Republic 
Sourcebook, 23.  
107 Modris Eksteins, “War, Memory, and Politics: The Fate 
of the Film All Quiet on the Western Front, 70.  
108 Ibid, 71.  
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audience.109 The outrage stemmed from a claim that the film 
injured Germany’s image, and was part of a ‘propaganda 
war’ being waged against Germany by the United States. 
Consequently, the film was banned on December 11th 
because of the harms it posed to Germany’s image.110   
Consequently, the Nazi party claimed a victory in 
the “film war” that had been waged over All Quiet, while 
outrage emanated from the liberal and socialist left. The left 
criticized the government for betraying its own republican 
ideals and capitulating to the threat of a mob. But while the 
liberal population of Berlin was outspoken about the result 
of the “film war,” other provinces of the country supported 
the government’s decision.111 Ultimately, no matter how 
truthful All Quiet’s portrayal of Germany’s experience in the 
war was, its threat to political stability was greater. The 
consequence of banning the film was that the government 
subtly justified the Nazi narrative of the war. In agreeing that 
the film was harmful to Germany’s international image and 
did not truthfully portray the German war experience, the 
Weimar Republic legitimized nationalist conceptions of the 
memory of World War I. And so, the Nazi Party walked 
away with a small but significant “victory” in its pocket and 
inched closer to its seizure of power in 1933. 
Ernst Friedrich, a writer and outspoken critic of 
war, contributed to the war debate when he published a 
photographic narrative of the Great War in protest of the 
violent ideals the promotion of war instituted within society. 
In 1924, Friedrich’s War Against War! was published as part 
of a larger antimilitarist campaign as German citizens gained 
knowledge of Germany’s organization of the Black 
Reichswehr to secretly rearm itself.112 As professor and 
historian Dora Apel asserted, at the time of War Against 
War’s publication, “the organized pacifist movement was 
politically contained by the ruling Social Democrats and 
effectively moribund; war imagery shifted dramatically 
away from antiwar statements in graphic art and paintings 
toward heroic imagery in hugely popular patriotic 
photography albums.”113 Friedrich’s work was an ambitious 
attempt to shift the popular support for heroism and re-center 
the narrative on the inhumane consequences of the First 
World War. The images he chose to include emphasize the 
gruesome mutilation and destruction that war causes to men 
of all nations, religions, and political affiliations.  
Friedrich’s technique was to heighten the sense of 
horror at the reality of modern war by presenting 
photographs in pairs where one celebrated the war and the 
other presented its horrid truth. He begins with a photo titled 
“From the August days of 1914 — Enthusiastic . . . for what? 
. . .”114 The image shows a mix of young men, some outfitted 
in military uniforms and others in civilian suits, all marching 
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through the streets of Germany, waving and smiling, holding 
bouquets and rifles adorned with flowers.115 Uncaptioned, 
one could mistake the image for one depicting a victorious 
army returning from war. Friedrich’s caption critiques the 
celebration of the ensuing war that took hold of Germans 
through the “Spirit of 1914.” Its pair finishes the caption 
with the phrase, “. . .for the ‘field of honor.’”116 The second 
photograph shows an indecipherable number of bodies at the 
front collected in a mass.117 None of the men are identifiable, 
their faces covered or too disfigured to tell. The anonymity 
of the second photo heightens its pacifist power, the soldiers 
could be of any army, nation, or political party. Friedrich’s 
pairing of the photos emphasizes the inhumanity of the 
conflict and attempts to contribute to the shaping of 
Weimar’s collective public memory over the war. Apel 
argues that Friedrich’s photographic narrative could not 
generate an alternative collective memory that was strong 
enough to oppose the rise of National Socialism.118  This, 
however, was not the point of Friedrich’s work, and no one 
could anticipate the success that the militaristic political 
right’s narrative would have. 
The war debate reached the artistic realm as well. 
Jay Winter’s Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning explores 
the depth of individual and mass bereavement inflicted by 
the First World War. Käthe Kollwitz was a prominent Berlin 
artist when the Great War broke out in 1914 and was known 
as a printmaker and a visual poet. Her son, Peter, volunteered 
for the war when he was eighteen-years-old, and was killed 
on October 30, 1914 in Flanders.119 Over the next seventeen 
years, Kollwitz would dedicate her artwork to Peter in an 
effort to memorialize him and the thousands of other 
children lost to the war. Kollwitz finished her project in 
April 1931, and it was placed in the Belgium cemetery were 
Peter is buried, adjacent to his grave.120 Her memorial, titled 
Die Eltern, or The Parents, is the sculpture of two figures in 
granite, both on their knees.121 Die Eltern makes tangible a 
palpable sense of guilt. Kollwitz and her husband are on their 
knees to beg for Peter’s forgiveness, “to ask him to accept 
their failure to find a better way, their failure to prevent the 
madness of war from cutting his life short.”122 Kollwitz’s 
sculpture expresses this guilt masterfully, and this sentiment 
of remorse adds another, more political dimension to her 
work. Kollwitz’s grief and guilt was heightened because of 
her original support for the war and encouragement of Peter 
to participate. This adds a collective meaning to her work 
that encompasses a larger memory landscape by 
acknowledging the role of a nation state in bereavement.123 
Kollwitz attempts to atone for her actions as a mother, and 
address how her decision fit into the larger narrative of a 
generation. Die Eltern connects to the antiwar narrative and 
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sense of betrayal that was presented by pro-republicans and 
Erich Maria Remarque in All Quiet on the Western Front. 
Kollwitz’s creation was born of her grief, and through this, 
she atones not only for her and her husband, but the folly of 
an entire generation that sent their sons to a slaughter. 
The element of betrayal and corruption was also 
addressed in political cartoons. In early April of 1919, 
George Grosz’s sketch of a military doctor and a soldier was 
published. Grosz was a German artist known for his 
caricature drawings, and was a member of the Berlin Dada 
and New Objectivity group.124 At the close of the war, 
Grosz’s work was dominated by satire and themes that 
addressed Weimar’s post-war mood. Grosz’s art addressed 
the betrayal of the revolution, the corruption of those in 
power, and the brutality of militarism.125 His sketch, 
Military doctor pronouncing a skeleton “K.V.” or active for 
duty, provides a biting critique on the role Imperial Germany 
and its supporters played in the slaughter of World War I. In 
his sketch, a robust German doctor embraces a rotting corpse 
while surrounded by military personnel who take notes and 
comment on the process.126 Grosz’s sketch is simultaneous 
critique of what the German army had become by 1918, and 
the role of medical professionals and military officials in its 
corruption. Grosz’s message is clear: German soldiers were 
dead men walking, even before they reached the front.       
5. CONCLUSION 
The memory of Germany’s experience in the First 
World War was fragmented from the moment war was 
declared in the summer of 1914. This fragmentation, 
combined with the loss of the war in 1918, resulted in a lack 
of public consensus on the war’s meaning. This aggravated 
Weimar’s political world, and consequently, the war’s 
memory was used as a tool by the conservatives and the 
extremist right to wage war against the Weimar Republic. 
The Treaty of Versailles, the diverse Stab-in-the-Back Myth, 
and propaganda against Jews, socialists, republicans, and 
women were used to delegitimize the republic. The left’s 
response, as seen in Ernst Friedrich’s photographic 
narrative, public denouncement of anti-Semitism, and 
attempts by the Reichsbanner to impart a pro-republican 
narrative, was inadequate to halt the right’s consolidation of 
power in 1933. Political debate seeped into the realm of 
literature as well, and the novel and film, All Quiet on the 
Western Front, presents an example of the significance of 
the war’s contestation eleven years after its end in 1918. A 
collective lack of consensus on the war’s meaning was used 
by the right to both dismantle the Weimar republic from 
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6. INDEX  
 
 
Figure 1: A crowd of Germans gather in Berlin holding the 
portrait of Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph I to support their 
ally in the face of a burgeoning conflict with Serbia. 
Photograph taken by an unknown photographer, dated 




Figure 2: Cartoonist Werner Hahmann’s interpretation of 
Hindenburg’s testimony in The Stab-in-the-Back-Myth and 
the Fall of the Weimar Republic: A History in Documents 
and Visual Sources edited by George S. Vascik and Mark R. 
Sadler.  
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Figure 3: A poster advertises “No More War” and a July 31, 
1922 commemoration ceremony to honor those killed in 
combat. The commemoration was to take place in Munich. 
Poster in Benjamin Ziemann’s Contested Commemorations.  
 
 
Figure 4: Reichsbanner members march at a rally in Potsdam 
in militaristic formation holding German flags. Photograph 




Figure 5: German soldiers march to war in August 1914, in 
Ernst Friedrich’s War Against War! 
 
 
Figure 6: The mass grave of unidentifiable soldiers on the 
battlefield, in Ernst Friedrich’s War Against War! 
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Figure 7: Die Eltern by Käthe Kollwitz, Roggevelde German 
war cemetery, Vladslo, Belgium, image in Jay Winter’s Sites 
of Memory, Sites of Mourning. 
 
 
Figure 8: Military doctor pronouncing skeleton “K.V” or fit 
for active duty, drawing by George Grosz in 
Grosz/Heartfield: The Artist as Social Critic.  
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